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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
intruders without a finding that the disputed parcel of land was, in fact, Indian
land.
In answer to the dissent, that too broad a meaning has been given to
Section 8, it can be said that a broader interpretation has been given to the
Dibble case than that intended. Therefore, the decision of this case is not
contrary to the rule in New York, but rather, it merely gives to Section 8 the
full interpretation it was meant to have. Thus, it can be concluded that this
case does add somewhat to the prior rule by establishing the full powers of the
County Court under Section 8.
It would be an unreasonable technicality to hold that Section 8 only gives
the Court power to determine whether an individual is an intruder or not, and
that the Court does not have power in making such a determination, to determine the right and title in the land intruded upon.
EMINENT DOMAIN-DENIAL OF INTEREST PRIOR TO FILING OF CLAIM

The constitutionality of New York Court of Claims Act, Section 19, Subdivision 1, which denies interest to a claimant for a period beginning six months
after accrual of a claim until the claim is filed,50 was upheld in La Porte v.
State.51
Title to an unimproved strip of claimants' lot vested in the State for
thruway use by an appropriation on June 1, 1953, pursuant to the New York
Highway Law Section 347, Subdivision 5-2, when a map and description of the
property was filed by the State with the County Clerk of the county in which
the property was located. A claim for compensation was filed on April 7, 1955.
Personal service on claimants was effected later in the same month. The Court
of Claims allowed interest from June 1, 1953, until the claim was filed, upholding the claimants' contention that a denial of interest from the end of six
months after the accrual until the claim was filed, was a failure to allow just
compensation for the appropriation and was therefore unconstitutional. 2 The
Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the claim holding that, "if nothing
occurred to bring home knowledge of taking to claimants, they had the full
use and benefit of the land during the interval and could not reasonably expect
both interest and possession."'53 The Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision
affirmed on the same grounds and thereby held Section 19, Subdivision 1,
constitutional. The dissenting opinion particularly challenged the "outrageous"
twenty-two month delay in serving notice, rejected the proposition that full use
and possession are a substitute for interest where claimant has no knowledge
of the taking, argued that the New York Legislature intended a claim to
50. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 19 states:
If a claim which bears interest is not filed until more than six months
after the accrual of said claim, no interest shall be allowed between the
expiration of six months from the time of such accrual and the time of
the filing of such claim.
51. 6 N.Y.2d 1, 187 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1959).
52. La Porte v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 419, 159 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
53. La Porte v. State, 5 A.D.2d 362, 172 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1958).
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accrue on notice and interpreted the constitution to require some interest to be
paid for the appropriation from the time of vesting until a claim did accrue
on notice.
La Porte is apparently the first case dealing with a Section 19 claim, seeking interest because of the taking of title without claimant having personal
notice of the taking through service or loss of possession. Condemnation cases,
cited by the Court for the proposition that "no constitutional mandate is
violated by the denial of interest while the owner has enjoyed the full beneficial use of his premises," 54 differ from La Porte, in that title in those cases did
not vest in the State until the condemnee had been personally served; therefore,
the question at issue related to the payment of interest from notice rather than
title vesting.
The notion that possession, continued use and enjoyment are compensation and should be an offset to the claim for interest runs through condemnation cases cited by the court. 55 Had this offset been claimed by the State, it
would apparently have settled the mind of the majority as to the constitutional
requirement of compensation, for, on the facts of the case, offset exceeding
the interest claimed might have been had by the State for the twenty-two
months during which claimants had undisputed possession of the property.
Since the offset was not claimed, the Court reached the constitutional issue.
New York's Constitution requires just compensation be paid for property taken
by the State.58 Since the claimants had full use of the property from the initial
vesting in the State until the claim was filed, the question in the present case
is whether or not property was taken from claimants solely on the basis of the
State's taking of title. The court does not equate loss of title to "taking of
property." New York has thus defined "taking": "It is sufficient that the
person claiming compensation has some right or privilege secured by grant,
in the property appropriated to the public use, which right or privilege is
destroyed, injured or abridged by such appropriation. Any limitation on the
free use and enjoyment of property constitutes a taking." 57 The United States
Supreme Court held in United States v. Dickenson that property is taken
within the meaning of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, "when inroads
are made upon the owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private
parties, a servitude has been acquired either by an agreement or in course of
54. Supra note 51 at 741; Donnelly v. City of Brooklyn, 121 N.Y. 9, 7 N.Y. Supp.

49 (City Ct. 1889); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1892); see also Jacobs
v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
55. In re Mayor of City of New York, 40 App. Div. 281, 58 N.Y. Supp. 58 (1st
Dep't 1899). Claimants sought payment for the value of land appropriated for park use,
for interest, taxes and assessments. It was held that they were entitled to their money and

its use, but the value of the retained possession of the land from the time title was taken
until the claim was settled, had to be used as an offset and thus no interest was allowable.
See Hamersley v. Mayor of City of New York, 56 N.Y. 533 (1874).

56. N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 7(a): "Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation."
57. Story v. New York El. R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882).
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time."5 8g Absent special circumstances, it does not seem from either the Federal
or State definitions that the mere taking of title is such a limitation on the
free use and enjoyment of property as to constitute a taking which requires
compensation. 59 The holding of this case, that the unsuspected loss of legal title
to land without loss of possession does not require compensation in the form of
the interest on the principal obligation except to the extent permitted by
statute, is consistent with this conclusion. If the claimant has knowledge, he
may file a claim and interest runs from the time of such filing. Section 19
seems to go a step further than is constitutionally required, and gives interest
on a claim for six months where title is transferred to the State under the Highway Law, even if claimant has no knowledge of the appropriation.
EMINENT DOMAIN-CoNTRACTuAL EXEMPTION

In Society of the New York Hospital v. Johnson,60 a bill for injunctive
relief was against the State Superintendent of Public Works. The Society of
the New York Hospital Argued that it had a contractual exemption from the
exercise of eminent domain upon its hospital lands, as manifested by special
statute of 1927, which had neither been expressly nor impliedly repealed. 01
The Superintendent, while conceding the exemption rested upon contract and
there had been no express repeal, contended that the simultaneous enactment
of an amendment to the charter of the City of White Plains, prohibiting the
taking of the Society's hospital lands, 2 indicated that the statute upon which
58. 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1957). U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; "No person shall be . . .
deprived of . . . property without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." The provision for just compensation
is applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment; Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
59. "May we say that . . . what he does not know does not hurt him?" from
dissenting opinion, supra note 51 at 746. The dissent suggests that a condemnee may be
hurt: (1) he may unknowingly improve the land, (2) he may be a paying tenant of the
State whether he likes it or not, (3) he may be deprived of time to seek new premises.
Also, the condemnee may be subject to damages if he unknowingly makes a contract
to sell land the title to which is in the State.
60. 5 N.Y.2d 102, 180 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1958).
61. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1927, c. 659, § 1 provides;
. . . No street or avenue or road shall hereafter be laid out or opened
through or upon any of the lands and premises in the City of White
Plains, lying between Mamaroneck Avenue, Bloomingdale Road, Westchester Avenue, North Street, The St. Agnes Home, Land of Daniel
Maloney and the Burke Foundation, and none of said land shall be taken
for any use whenever and so long as the same shall be owned or occupied
for hospital purposes by the Society of the New York Hospital, provided
however, that the said The Society of The New York Hospital shall
dedicate, without claim or award for damages, for street purposes, the
following parcels of land, and shall, in addition thereto, provide one
hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the paving and regulating of the
street described in said parcels one and two ....
62. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1927, c. 653, provided an amendment to the Charter of White
Plains in the following substance:
It shall be unlawful to open any streets through the grounds belonging to The Society of The New York Hospital, now occupied by Bloomingdale Hospital as long as the same is owned or occupied for hospital
purposes.

